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Abstract  
Phenomenological, process-based and post-Marxist approaches have stressed the immanent 
nature of the ontogenesis of our world. The concept of performativity epitomizes these 
temporal, spatial and material views. Reality is always in movement itself: it is constantly 
materially and socially ‘performed’. Other views lead to a pre-defined world that would be 
mostly revealed through sensations (i.e. ‘representational perspectives’). These transcendental 
stances assume that a subject, although pre-existing experience, is the absolute condition of 
possibility of it. In this paper, we develop another view of performativity (either complementary 
or interrelated to an immanent stance), one that re-introduces transcendence in the analysis but 
sees in it something dialogical to the process itself. We draw from the notions of visibility-
invisibility and continuity-discontinuity (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2013, 1964) in order to show 
how everyday activity both performs and makes visible the world. From that perspective, modes 
of visibility appear as conditions of possibility of performativity itself. We draw some 
implications for the conceptualization of management practices.  
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1. Introduction: Performativity… a disembodied process?  
 
This paper is concerned with the tensions between ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendental’ 
stances and the implications of these tensions for the field of Management and Organisation 
Studies (MOS). More precisely, we position our paper as an attempt to momentarily ‘reconcile’ 
these two stances through a focus on the concept of performativity (sensu Austin) and the 
Merleau-Pontian concepts of visibility/invisibility and continuity/discontinuity. We set to 
develop another view of performativity (either complementary or interrelated to an immanent 
stance), one that re-introduces transcendence in the analysis and yet sees in it something 
dialogical to the process itself. By drawing from the concepts of visibility/invisibility and 
continuity/discontinuity (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2013, 1964), we set out to show how everyday 
activity both performs and ‘makes visible’. Modes of visibility appear as processual conditions 
of possibility of performativity itself. Such position could consist in seeing organizing processes 
as constituting the conditions of possibility of their own perception and actions in the flow of 
everyday activities themselves. What is visible or invisible, continuous or discontinuous in the 
joint assemblage of people and objects involved in the flow of organizing becomes a key issue 
in the process of becoming itself, its inter-corporeity and emotional dynamic (Küpers, 2014).   
Adopting such an ontological stance allows us to articulate three potential contributions. 
First, this allows us to focus the description of performativity not only on results (or finalised 
outcomes) but also on the process itself, which then appears as an emergent perceptual 
condition of possibility. Second, by inviting us to be more attuned to the complexity, 
multifacetedness and embodiness of performances, our suggested conceptual stance enables us 
to explore some of the key aspects of the becoming of work practices, in the context of which 
collaborative entrepreneurship, communities, emotions, ‘doing together’, craftsmanship and 
inter-corporeity are increasingly more important (Spinuzzi, 2012; Garrett et al., 2017). Indeed, 
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work and managerial practices tend to make both the visibility and continuity of collective 
activities more problematic than ever, with the generalization of open spaces, mobile work, 
working at home or open innovation (Anderson, 2009; Johns and Gratton, 2013; Borg and 
Söderlung, 2015; Gandini, 2015; Taylor, 2015; Bouncken and Reuschl, 2018). Finally, the 
explicit inclusion of a ‘transcendental loop’ may keep open a wider space for discussions about 
personal ethic and collective engagement in civic life (Arendt, 1958/1998). Keeping this 
conversational space between bodies and stressing the on-going exploration of the past in the 
present with a sense of freedom and responsibility is part of what we see as a transcendental 
dimension in the immanence of processes.  
This paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the notion of 
performativity (as developed by Austin) and presents the Merleau-Pontian concept of visibility 
in order to articulate a different view on performativity (a view that sets out to ‘transcend’ the 
immanence/transcendence dualism). This lays the foundations of our third section, which 
consists in a reflection on the implications of our conceptual development with regards to our 
understanding of management and new work practices. We conclude this paper on the political 
ramifications of our dialogue between performativity and visibility. 
 
2. Oscillating between or combining performativity and visibility: A Merleau-Pontian 
invitation 
 
Performativity: Back to key social, material and temporal debates 
 
The notion of performativity lies at the heart of numerous ontological discussions in 
MOS (Orlikowski, 2005; Spicer et al., 2009; Cabantous and Gond, 2011; Guérard et al., 2013; 
Wickert and Schaefer, 2015; Gond et al., 2016; de Vaujany and Mitev, 2017). These discussions 
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draw from debates within various areas of scholarship, such as linguistics (Austin, 1962), 
gender studies (Butler, 1990, 1993) or Science and Technology Studies (Barad, 2007). In a 
sense, this turn towards performativity can be traced back to the work of the British philosopher 
of language John Langshaw Austin. For Austin (1962), a discourse instantiates the object that 
it refers to; put differently, ‘words do something in the world, something that is not just a matter 
of generating consequences’ (Loxley, 2007: 2). This idea of a performative utterance refers to 
what Austin (1962) calls a ‘speech-act’: a sentence is not a simple statement or description of 
what people are doing; the sentence actually performs the action.  
Austin (1962) distinguishes between constative and performative sentences. A 
constative sentence is concerned with facts and built around truth-values. Contrariwise, a 
performative utterance is not truth-evaluable and is always part of an action simultaneously 
performed as it is being uttered. As an instance of performative sentence, Austin (1962: 5) 
proposes the following: ‘I bet you six pence it will rain tomorrow’. He also distinguished 
explicitly from inexplicitly performative sentences. The performative power of discourse will 
require the actualisation of certain ‘felicity conditions’ upon which the performative sentence 
relies (Austin, 1962; Loxley, 2007). For instance, the utterance ‘I now pronounce you husband 
and wife (or wife and wife, or husband and husband)’, which produces the social construct of 
marriage, is often accompanied by certain artefacts (e.g. a suit, a white dress, rings, etc.), 
specific individuals (e.g. witnesses, the mayor, a priest, etc.) and frequently takes place in a 
specific and ritualized context (e.g. a town hall, a church, etc.) – these form the felicity 
conditions of the utterance. In that sense, the material underpinnings, mediations or contexts 
(embodying an institution) connected to a particular speech contribute to making this speech 
performative. Interestingly, the distinction between ‘performative’ and ‘constative’ utterances 
has been questioned by Austin himself (see Austin, 1962) and by critics of his work (see for 
example Jakobson, 1985 or Searle, 1989).   
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More recent research has stressed the material (i.e. signs can be more than texts and 
symbols) and temporal (i.e. performativity is present time, as our experience is always 
performative) dimensions of the notion of performativity (see for example Pickering, 1995; 
Sedgwick and Parker, 1995; Barad, 2007; Muniesa and Callon, 2013). From a performative 
perspective, agency ‘performs’; put differently, in an entangled way, it materially and socially 
constitutes our world (Pickering, 1995; Barad, 2007). From a performative stance, there are no 
pre-defined entities. Agency may inhere in tools such as assemblages of software packages, 
screens, computers and models that perform design, calculation and even composition 
(Orlikowski, 2002; Cooren, 2004). In the context of Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
discussions, the concept of intra-action epitomizes this tendency (Barad, 1999, 2003, 2007). 
Past, present and future are present in activity itself, constituted and constitutive of it with it not 
being necessarily the intentional effect of a creative human agent: devices can act. Furthermore, 
performative stances are in clear opposition to ‘representational philosophies’ (Lorino et al., 
2011). Representational approaches see language and signs as direct and unmediated 
representations of reality. In contrast, phenomenological (Heidegger, 1927/1996; Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/2013), pragmatic (Dewey, 1938/2007; Peirce, 1903/1997) and post-Marxist 
stances link truth to actions and performances.  
From a performative perspective, an immanent becoming constitutes the core aspect of 
ontology (Dewsbury, 2000). This has notably been evidenced through the body of literature 
lying at the intersection of ‘process philosophy’ and organisation studies (Tsoukas and Chia, 
2002; Hernes, 2008, 2014; Nayak and Chia, 2011; Olsen, 2011; Küpers, 2014; Aroles and 
McLean, 2016; Helin et al., 2016) as well as in some STS-inspired perspectives, such as agential 
realism (Barad, 2003) or the actor-network theory (Czarniawska and Hernes, 2005; Latour, 
2005).  
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Carefully describing the network and all the mediations identified through a pragmatist 
inquiry is a key objective when adopting a performative lens. Time is itself ontological (based 
on duration, manifestation and time reckoning systems) and the researcher can ultimately 
delimit a ‘field of events’ (Hernes, 2014). Through descriptions, everything can look to be 
mediation but in a world becoming more and more global and liquid (Bauman, 2013), subject 
to continuous changes and dyschronies (Alter, 2000; de Vaujany et al., 2018), the ontology of 
performativity provides a powerful theoretical stance. Time, necessarily, is the main concern of 
any ontology of performativity. 
 
Visibility: Exploration of a neglected late Merleau-Pontian concept 
 
 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2013, 1948, 1964), who died just one year before the publication 
of How to do things with words (Austin, 1962), was particularly interested in the 
visibility/invisibility and continuity/discontinuity loops at stake in the processes of perception 
and embodiment. Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2013) view of (embodied) perception is by no means 
representative: perception is not sensation. Perceiving means constructing through senses more 
than reproducing through senses. As such, seeing is by no means an isomorphic process (Ibid.). 
Beyond space and materiality, time is also a construction in Merleau-Ponty’s work. We spend 
most of our present time in the past; we re-enact forms and structures already perceived and 
efficient for our activities. Should we really perceive continuously the world through all our 
senses (separately), we would quickly be cognitively and emotionally exhausted. 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2013, 1948, 1964) also suggested two key loops and dimensions 
in the process of perception. For him, visibilities and invisibilities are key dimensions of our 
everyday activities. In order to perceive and act, we need to create a lot of invisibilities. As we 
cannot simultaneously face the innumerable sensations conveyed by our embodied experience 
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of the world, we must put many other things aside. For instance, in order to write these lines, 
we need to put aside the noise of the street, overcome a pain somewhere in the body, ignore 
email and phone notifications, etc. According to Merleau-Ponty (1964), visibilities and 
invisibilities are thus not the opposite of each other; invisibilities are the scaffolding of 
visibilities and also often what could make visibilities possible and extend them. Time, which 
is seen by Merleau-Ponty (1954-1955/2003) as the epitome of an institution (Terzi, 2017), is a 
key emotion in the process of balancing visibilities and invisibilities. To write, one needs to put 
aside nostalgia (a disturbing past) and anxiety (an impeding future). These sensorial 
invisibilities will then reinforce the visibility of one’s activities for oneself.  
These visibility/invisibility loops are not just the product of individual necessities (e.g. 
cognitive); they also have a historicity. Codes of visibility/invisibility evolve over time. For 
example, a request on Google Maps is probably constitutive of a different temporality and 
enacts a different institution to that of the walk of the flâneur in the Haussmannian Paris of the 
19th century. It was probably easier to ‘feel’ the infrastructure related to the place and the 
underlying domination mechanisms (in particular through collective conversations but also 
through intensive immersions into the city) in the case of the flâneur than in the context of 
individual immersions into Google requests and the complex set of algorithms behind it. The 
same relation underlies continuity & discontinuity (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) and activity & 
passivity (Merleau-Ponty, 1954-1955/2003); far from being oppositional, they mutually 
constitute each other.  
Constitutive of modes of visibility and continuity, expression is both a form of 
embodiment and an event. The subject is constructed and visible for oneself. What interests 
Merleau-Ponty ‘is the establishment of the event, and not primarily and essentially the 
establishment of the subject in the event’ (Gély, 2000: 355). This establishment of the subject 
(and one’s body) in the event is also present in some research about performativity that shares 
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communalities with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. This is notably the case of Butler’s 
(1990) view of embodiment and its relationship with performativity (Stoller, 2010). The ability 
to locate gender and organs (and their affordance) is inseparable from the performative 
movements of society (whereas Merleau-Ponty would stress their emotional and body-
grounded progressive internationalization).  
In slight contrast to an ontology of performativity, from the viewpoint of an ‘ontology 
of visibility’, researchers should be particularly careful about the variety of things and the 
degree of ‘thingification’ that they make of the worlds they investigate and the miscellaneous 
underlying assumptions and other worlds that relate to them. Relations and identifications will 
be central to an empirical engagement with the notions of visibility and invisibility. Surprises, 
anomalies, and breakdowns should be carefully explored in order to make sense of the 
potentially symbolic and/or material objects that are part of an instrumentation or extension of 
the corporeal scheme (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; de Vaujany et al., 2018). More generally, the 
researcher is both immersed and situated in a relation of ‘care’ and ‘responsibility’ towards the 
object of the research, which is questioned with regards to all those modalities of understanding 
that produce and reproduce the worlds that surround it. Ultimately, an ‘ontology of visibility’ 
always implies a flow of meaning, which may be a movement from one anthropological system 
to another, from a natural to a questioning attitude, etc.  
The following section briefly summarises in a table the two perspectives 
aforementioned, namely an ‘ontology of performativity’ and an ‘ontology of visibility’. This 
comparative summary will lay the foundation of our discussion of the implications of 
establishing a dialogue between the concepts of performativity and visibility for the field of 
MOS. 
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Performativity and visibility: The latter as the embodied description of the former?  
 
If a performative ontology gives sense to the notions of inseparability and relationality 
(applied by Jones (2013) to the concept of ‘entanglement’), an ‘ontology of visibility’ provides 
more room to the notions of embodiment, reversibility and interpenetration. An ‘ontology of 
visibility’ shares commonalities with Marx’s (1959) view on the alienating dimension of work. 
Adler (2009) underlines that for Marx, the prototypal activity is practical (the famous Thesis 
Eleven). Hook (2002) argues that Marx’s and Dewey’s understandings of practical activity are 
very similar. Marx’s account situates humans as world makers and shapers who use both 
concrete and symbolic tools. Material tools, abstract ideas, theories and human desires always 
mediate material realities. Their relation to collective forms of social organization mediates 
individuals’ relations to such materiality: people construct social reality but not always under 
circumstances of their own choosing and they do not do so either as idealists or as wholly social 
animals. They are animals capable of imaginaries, socially constructed but materially more or 
less enabled or restricted. In short, performativity and visibility can be contrasted the following 
way (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
  
PERFORMATIVITY 
 
VISIBILITY  
(and INVISIBILITY) 
Definition The process of constitution 
(instead of ‘representation) of 
our world through the flow of 
everyday activities.  
The joint process of embodied 
perception and non-perception and the 
emergent conditions of possibilities of 
this process. 
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Ontological 
stance 
Mainly immanent. Life and 
organizing are always in the flow. 
Everyday activities perform our 
shared reality, which is a 
duration, a temporality and a 
sense of ‘happening’.   
Both immanent and transcendental. 
Visibilities-invisibilities are emergent 
conditions of possibilities (i.e. 
constituted in and through the flow 
itself) of the continuities-discontinuities 
of the process. Continuities-
discontinuities are also emergent 
discontinuities of visibilities-
invisibilities in a sense of happening.  
Status of an 
external, 
pre-existing 
world 
There is no pre-existing world or 
pre-existing entities. World is 
always assembled and constituted 
temporally, materially and 
socially through activities. 
There is no pre-existing world, but there 
are conditions of possibilities immanent 
to the flow itself (i.e. a transcendence in 
the immanence or a transcendental 
dimension in immanence/process).  
Key 
references 
Austin’s (1962) and Searle’s 
(1989) description of linguistic 
performativity and felicity 
conditions; Pickering’s (1995) 
notion of ‘performative idioms’; 
Barad’s (2007) view of intra-
action, performativity and 
material discursive practices.   
Merleau-Ponty’s (1954-1955/2003) 
lectures at the Collège de France and his 
description of visibilities/invisibilities, 
continuities/discontinuities (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964). Butler’s (1990, 2015) 
view of gender as performative.  
 
Table 1: Performativity versus visibility  
 
3. Performativity and visibility: Implications for MOS  
  
This section is articulated around the three potential contributions of this paper, as stated 
in the introduction. The positioning of visibility as a strong ontological stance raises the 
question of the ontological relationship between the concepts of performativity and visibility; 
can they be complementary? Are they interrelated? The second contribution is to articulate a 
different view (post-Kantian) on the notion of condition of possibilities, which may lead to 
research that would be more in phase with contemporary trends in work practices (e.g. new 
forms of collaborative work, etc.). Lastly, we also see this work as resulting in more reflexive 
discussions about ethics with regards to MOS.  
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Ontologies of performativity and visibility: Complementary or interrelated views of practices 
and processes?  
 
Performing requires making visible and invisible things as well as both continuing (i.e. 
using pre-reflexive perceptions reproduced in present time) and setting up discontinuities 
(something is ‘happening’ inside and beyond these continuities). Everyday activities are both 
in the flow and immanent, and the flow itself requires and produces the phenomenological 
conditions of its continuity and duration. As explained by Merleau-Ponty (1960: 305), ‘in this 
network of calls and answers, where the beginning metamorphoses and accomplishes itself, 
there is a duration that belongs to no-one but to everyone, a ‘public duration’, the ‘rhythm and 
proper speed of the event of the world’ that, according to Péguy, would be the theme of a true 
sociology’.  
Compatible and complementary stances see in performativity and visibility two distinct 
ontologies that are (more or less) harmonious. A stance stressing the importance of embodiment 
versus one which does not give an importance anymore to sense-making and embodiment may 
result in the second perspective (i.e. complementarity) (Küpers, 2014). Flesh is a different 
matter, and its involvement in the process of becoming may lead to a specific ontology, which 
is complementary to that of performativity. From the viewpoint of MOS, this has some clear 
and practical implications. A non-embodied and non-flesh-focused view of performativity may 
lead to a stress on assemblages viewed and enacted for and by themselves. The text of the 
assemblage, as revealed through the dialogical process of writing and inquiring, is at the heart 
of the study. For instance, exploring the performativity of a new search engine, a balanced score 
card, a new managerial practice will flow itself. In contrast, a flesh-grounded and embodied 
description of performativity is likely to lead to a more sense-making and inter-corporeate-
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oriented description of the process of becoming. One possible drawback is a possible over-
focus on human agency and ‘emotional flow’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945).  
We contend that these two views are more than simply compatible or complementary; 
they are interrelated. In that sense, we join Merleau-Ponty’s (1960: 267) reflexion: ‘The truth 
is that the relationships between the natural and the transcendental attitudes are not simple, are 
not side by side or sequential, like the false of the apparent and the true’. We see the process of 
becoming as both immanent and transcendental in the sense that the process produces its own 
conditions of possibilities. Visibility/invisibility loops and continuity/discontinuity modes 
emerge in the flow itself of everyday activities, which is more and more at stake in 
contemporary work practices of digital mobility, coworking, Do It Yourself or working at home 
where individual need to set up and maintain their emotional, cognitive and social work 
bubbles.  
  
Visibility-invisibility and continuity-discontinuity loops as condition of possibility of 
performativity 
 
The notion of condition of possibility is often linked to Kantian and neo-Kantian views 
of reality (Russon, 2007). Time, space, God and divinity appear as conditions of absolute 
possibilities to do something or formulate a thought. They are absolute and pure categories 
likely to help us build knowledge beyond sensible experience (see Kant, 1781/1999, 
1783/2002). Other philosophical approaches have defended empirical or realistic views of 
transcendence; this is notably the case of Critical Realism, as advocated by Archer (1995). 
These approaches aim to identify empirically and creatively (imagination and abduction have 
an important role to play) grounded conditions of possibilities for agency (e.g. ‘generative 
mechanisms’). To avoid the epistemic fallacy (i.e. conflating epistemology with ontology, 
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transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge), researchers would thus need to consider 
jointly a phenomenological world (of reflexivity), a locus of subjective time and a ‘real’ world, 
both the ‘real’ construction that is the emergent effects of individual activities, the context of 
upcoming agencies, a locus of objective time. This would lead to the idea that performativity 
itself is a process ‘conditioned’ by endogenous mechanisms (i.e. neurologic generative 
mechanisms) that underlie perceptions. This is not what we suggest in the context of this paper. 
Both philosophical stances (Kantian and critical realist) put aside the notions of embodiment 
and becoming. As noted in the introduction, we are concerned with the ways in which we may 
be able to endow the notion of performativity with a sense of embodiment and sensations. As 
such, we defend emergent views on the conditions of possibilities of managerial practices, part 
of the flow itself, as co-constituted by the flow of everyday activities.  
 Let us take a contemporary example. Entrepreneurs involved in the practice of pitching 
their business models in a coworking space make visible some logics, some specific 
entrepreneurial metaphors and the urgent temporality of their entrepreneurial project. They 
make more invisible some implementations and partnerships necessary to move forward and 
materialize their project. They suggest how discontinuous their project might be, but to do so 
they need to rely on the routines of entrepreneurship and the place where they perform their 
pitch. At the very moment of their pitch, they feel their audience, make invisible some things 
they wanted to say because the previous entrepreneurs mentioned it, and if they want to make 
visible the originality of their project, they have to remove what appeared 20 minutes ago as a 
key idea. The performativity of their speech relies on a complex entanglement of visibilities 
and invisibilities unfolding as the utterance progresses. In short, during their pitch, they have to 
co-create the conditions of possibilities of their communication and make joint differences and 
repetitions.  
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In a sense, this could be related to Merleau-Ponty’s (1960: 283) take on loneliness as 
necessarily related to togetherness: ‘Saying that the ego ‘before’ others is alone implies 
situating it with regards to the ghost of another, at least it involves perceiving an environment 
where others could be. The true and transcendental loneliness is not this one: it occurs only if 
the other is not conceivable, and this requires that there is not a self to claim this loneliness. We 
are truly alone, provided that we are not aware of it; it is precisely this ignorance that is our 
loneliness.’  
 
Senses, perceptions and embodiment: Towards an ethic of performativity with visibility?  
 
Making visible raises the question of for whom and to what purpose (at the risk of 
perhaps overstating human agency). It also implicitly and immediately raises the question of 
invisibility. What and who is put aside in the visibility and ordering of everyday activities? In 
other words, what and who gets annexed, silenced and other-ed in this process of performing 
visibilities and invisibilities. As noted by Thøgersen (2014: 29), ‘what we actually express is 
not primarily a matter of our own intentions – a will-to-speak – based on ready-made-thoughts; 
but rather a matter of our immediate emotional grounded response to our surroundings and 
hence also based on whether the opportunities for certain expressions exist within our current 
surroundings, within our current experience of the world’.  
An ontology of visibility brings with it alterity, otherness and togetherness (Descola, 
2012). It also creates a locus for reflexivity, as it anchors becoming into ‘inter-corporeity’ (more 
than flesh). Emotions we jointly feel, affects we invest in are the main matter of everyday ethics. 
Their positive or negative presence/absence need to be illuminated and discussed in the key 
agora of our cities. Butler (2015) thus stressed the importance of public gathering and the 
performativity of numerous bodies assembled in a public space. This has always had a political 
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effect that is largely leveraged today by social media and micro-blogging (Sergi and Bonneau, 
2016; Vaast et al., 2017). For Merleau-Ponty (1945: 417), ‘My freedom, the fundamental power 
which I enjoy of being the subject of all my experiences, is not distinct from my insertion in the 
world. It is a fate for me to be free, to be unable to reduce myself to anything that I experience, 
to maintain in relation to any factual situation a faculty of withdrawal, and this fate was sealed 
the moment my transcendental field was thrown open, when I was born as vision and 
knowledge, when I was thrown into the world’. 
 
4. Conclusion: Towards a political philosophy of management?  
 
The work (in particular the later work) of Merleau-Ponty has been the subject of 
numerous misunderstandings, in particular his view of embodiment. His focus on embodiment 
and inter-corporeity is not a way to introduce another matter that would be flesh itself (Reynolds 
and Roffe, 2016)1. Merleau-Ponty wanted, most of all, to stress the importance of reversibility 
and emotional flow and to place them at the heart of the process of becoming (Küpers, 2014). 
The flow can be seen as pure immanence (with probably a pure Bergsonian view). It can also 
be viewed as a dialogical process: interrelated transcendental-immanent dialogical loops. 
Embodiment is a condition of possibility of experience, or rather, is at the heart of the emergent 
conditions of possibilities of experience (their continuities and visibilities).  
If the former view places a greater focus on the risk of an overstress of temporal 
dynamics as constituted by the assemblage itself and time as a textual, aspatial and ‘aemotional’ 
                                                          
1 Furthermore, it is not a way to put aside instruments, techniques and the materiality of our world. Instruments 
and materiality are part of the experience and of our pre-reflexivity. Merleau-Ponty sees them as relevant mainly 
if they are part of the broader process of visibility-invisibility, continuity-discontinuity and passivity-activity that 
is at the heart of the emergent conditions of possibilities of collective activity. He also believes in the ontology and 
materiality of our world, but suggests that we temporally live in a present that is often ahead of ‘real’ matter and 
the ‘real’ world (we are inhabited by past mediations). We re-cognize and re-activate perceptions more than we 
sense the world. We come close to matter ‘as it is’ in a pure experience, mainly when something wrong happens. 
What’s going on? Instruments and objects at hands then take their shape, colors and matters in the field of our 
experience.   
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narrative, the latter increases the risk of overstating human agency, emotions and pre-reflexive 
narratives. All this is far from being neutral politically and entices us to engage more than ever 
with the political philosophy wished by Arendt2 (1958/1998). 
What is the world of work and management we wish to constitute and make visible 
through our empirical and conceptual descriptions and what are the tools we use for this task? 
As noted by Arendt (1958: 26), ‘homo faber could be redeemed from this predicament of 
meaninglessness ... only through the interrelated faculties of action and speech, which produce 
meaningful stories as naturally as fabrication produces use objects’. Furthermore, with the view 
of a world made of assemblages and discourses, the political engineering of this world is also a 
question of performing and making visible the ‘right’ assemblages. This also implies 
discussions and texts questioning the responsibility of all those individually constituting the 
assemblage. This requires making them continuously accountable of their agency (Sartre, 
1943/2003). This is sometimes difficult in the context of what appear as radical post-humanist 
(Hayles, 1999) and highly temporal views of agency and management.  
Another view stresses the pre-reflexivity, emotions, perceptions and inter-corporeity at 
the heart of becoming (Küpers, 2014). Narration is then quickly a hermeneutic for and by itself 
(Ricoeur, 1983). However, this view can lead to managerial approaches (e.g. of design) more 
focused on bodies and embodiment (Küpers, 2014; de Vaujany and Vitaud, 2017) and can then 
perform a world less engaged in the possibilities of material agencies at large, that of the 
materiality performed, encountered by the assemblage itself. Putting together the two 
ontologies of performativity and visibility in management (which we see as co-authors as more 
than ‘complementary’ but interrelated) is a fascinating task for future research in management. 
A task we see as performative by itself. Performative for the best we hope.   
 
                                                          
2 See van Diest and Dankbaar (2008) and Nielsen (2016) on the relation between Arendt’s work and MOS. 
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